The Political Crisis in Poland 1980-82: Implications for East-West Relations by Bromke, Adam
The Political Crisis in Poland 1980-82: 




During most of modern history Eastern Europe has played a 
secondary role in international politics. While in the 19th century 
the Western Europeans, together with the Russians, were determining 
the workings of the world balance of power, the position of the 
Eastern European nations resembled that of colonial peoples in 
Asia, Africa and South America. At the time of the Congress of 
Vienna not a single country in that area enjoyed independence. All 
of Eastern Europe, in fact, was divided among the Ottoman, Aus-
trian and Russian Empires and the Kingdom of Prussia. With the 
decline of the Ottoman Empire the South-Eastern Europeans grad-
ually freed themselves from the Turkish rule, and, after World War 
I, with the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire, the defeat of Germany 
and the revolution in Russia, the Central and North-Eastern Euro-
peans attained independence. In 1918 a whole belt of new states 
emerged stretching from Yugoslavia to Finland. 
The independence of the Eastern European states, however, 
did not last long. During World War II they were all occupied by 
the Germans, and in 1944-45, in turn, most of them were conquered 
by the victorious Soviet armies. The USSR used this opportunity to 
consolidate its western boundaries incorporating the Baltic states 
and seizing considerable territories from Finland, Poland, Czecho-
slovakia and Rumania. With the establishment of the Soviet occu-
pational zone in East Germany, moreover, the USSR's military 
presence in Eastern Europe was perpetuated and the whole area 
was transformed into its zone of influence. The only two countries 
which escaped this fate were Greece in the south, which was pro-
tected initially by Britain and then by the United States and ulti-
mately jo ined N A T O , and Finland in the no r th , which while 
preserving freedom in domestic affairs has adopted friendly neu-
trality towards the Soviet Union. 
At the Conferences in Teheran and Yalta the western leaders 
accepted, if not de jure at least de facto1, the territorial changes and 
the establishment of the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern 
Europe. Britain considered Greece vital to protecting its position in 
the Mediterranean, but otherwise the western powers did not regard 
the region as of any great importance to them. Furthermore, they 
recognized as legitimate, Moscow's security interests in that area, 
traditionally a staging point for invasions of Russia. Churchill and 
Roosevelt, however, did not sanction either the forcible imposition 
of the Communist regimes or the direct Soviet interference in the 
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domestic affairs of the different Eastern European countries. The 
western powers expected that the Eastern Europeans, while main-
taining friendly relations with the USSR, would be free to select 
their own political systems, including democracy. In other words, 
the West hoped that Eastern Europe would assume a position similar 
to that of Finland, or to the position which Czechoslovakia enjoyed 
until the Communist coup there in 1948. 
Stalin's conception of his sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, 
nevertheless, was different. He was not satisfied with just protecting 
the Soviet security interests there and he proceeded with the Com-
munization of the area. In the late 1940s Moscow's direct controls 
over various Eastern European governments were considerably 
tightened and the Soviet model of Communism was vigorously 
enforced everywhere. The system was further strengthened by the 
establishment of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) 
in 1949 and of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. The Eastern European 
Communist states, thus, were reduced to being virtual satellites of 
the USSR. Only Yugoslavia, while retaining the Communist system 
at home, managed to preserve its internal independence and fol-
lowed a neutral course in its foreign policy. 
The Soviet conduct in Eastern Europe led to the emergence of 
the cold war in East-West relations. As one country in the region 
after another was communized, the western powers protested against 
what they considered as violations of the wartime agreements. Fi-
nally, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 brought about 
defence arrangements among several Western European states and, 
a year later, the establishment of NATO. Europe was divided into 
two opposing military and ideological blocs led by Moscow and 
Washington respectively. The partition of Germany was consoli-
dated with the Soviet occupational zone, now transformed into the 
German Democratic Republic, becoming an integral part of the 
Communist alliance. 
Following the death of Stalin Moscow's direct controls over 
various Eastern European governments were relaxed. Khrushchev 
preferred to rely on the ideological ties between the Communist 
parties and on the multilateral state bonds within CMEA and the 
WTO2 . Yet, the principle of maintaining a Communist system at 
home, basically patterned after that in the USSR, was still strictly 
upheld in Eastern Europe. When, in 1956, the Hungarians tried to 
embrace both neutrality and democracy, they were crushed by a 
Soviet invasion. 
In 1968, Brezhnev followed in Khrushchev's footsteps and, 
when the Czechs and Slovaks attempted to substantially democratize 
their system, they were suppressed by the WTO intervention. Even 
so, in the 1960s various other Eastern European countries succeeded 
in enlarging their independence from Moscow. The Albanians, 
while retaining an oppressive Communist system at home, managed 
to extricate themselves from Soviet control and even left the Warsaw 
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Pact. At the same time the Rumanians won considerable scope of 
maneuver in their foreign policy, while the Hungarians considerably 
expanded personal freedoms and carried out a major internal eco-
nomic reform. There appeared in Eastern Europe a growing variety 
of Communist systems, each with its own specific features fitting 
the country's own traditions.3 
With the advent in the early 1970s of East-West détente, the 
issue of Eastern Europe was placed once again on the international 
agenda. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
held in 1973-75, especially provided the western powers with an 
opportunity to revive at least some of the goals inherent in the 
wartime agreements with the USSR. Thirty years after the intro-
duction of Communism in the region the hopes for the emergence 
in Eastern Europe of democratic governments friendly to the USSR, 
similar to that of Finland, no longer seemed to be practical. How-
ever, building upon Moscow's tolerance of a growing variety of 
Communist systems in the area, the West strove to encourage their 
evolution, bringing them closer to their own traditions and the 
wishes of their people. The western insistence upon acceptance of 
Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act, providing for greater respect 
of human and civil rights, was aimed precisely at accomplishing this 
goal.4 The acceptance of Basket III by the USSR, in turn, was 
received by the West as tacit agreement to a peaceful and gradual 
expansion of freedom in Eastern Europe. 
The western powers, it must be emphasized, did not plan to 
use the CSCE to tear away Eastern Europe from the Warsaw Pact. 
In the first place, it had never been the West's goal to turn Eastern 
Europe against the USSR. Secondly, the entire concept of the CSCE 
rested upon recognition of the existing balance of power in Europe, 
reflecting the division of that continent into two blocs. It was 
recognized that any drastic change in this situation could have 
dangerous de-stabilizing effects in East-West relations. What the 
West hoped for, though, was that with the peaceful evolution in 
Eastern Europe, while preserving its close bonds with the Soviet 
Union, the area could emerge as natural bridge bringing the two 
sides closer together. As such, Eastern Europe could play a major 
constructive role in promoting East-West détente. 
The international significance of the popular upheaval in Po-
land in 1980-81 was that it was the first crisis erupting in Eastern 
Europe in the post-Helsinki era. Accordingly, it became a major test 
of many assumptions underlying East-West détente. 
II . 
Poland shared the turbulent history of Eastern Europe, al-
though often with a difference. It had been the most populous 
nation in the area and it was the last to lose its independence. As 
late as the 16th and 17th centuries the Kingdom of Poland, which 
at that time was united with Lithuania and the Ukraine, was a great 
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power. In 1683 in the battle of Vienna the Poles decisively checked 
the Turkish advance into Europe. Subsequently, however, Poland 
declined rapidly and toward the end of the 18th century it was 
completely divided between Russia, Prussia and Austria. Despite 
events, the Poles, imbued by memories of their past greatness, never 
accepted their subordinate status and in the 19th century staged 
repeated, although generally unsuccessful, insurrections against the 
occupying powers. 
After regaining its independence in 1918, Poland once again 
played an important role in European history. In 1920 in the battle 
of Warsaw, the Poles turned back Soviet Russia's advance into 
Europe. In 1939 they were the first to resist Nazi Germany with 
arms. After the defeat of their state at the beginning of World War 
II the Poles continued their struggle for independence on the side 
of the western powers and in the underground at home. In 1944 
they staged an uprising in Warsaw which, denied the support of 
the nearby Soviet forces, ended in a disaster. Toward the end of 
the war the dispute over the future status of Poland resulted in 
considerable friction between the western leaders and Stalin at the 
Teheran and Yalta Conferences. In a way, it was the first sign of 
the forthcoming cold war. 
In the immediate post-war years the Poles desperately opposed 
the communization of their country. By 1948, however, the open 
opposition as well as the underground resistance were crushed. 
Soon afterward the more independent Polish Communists, led by 
Wladyslaw Gomulka, were also weeded out of the party. During the 
final years of Stalin's rule Poland became fully integrated into the 
Soviet sphere of influence. It was linked to the USSR by the 
defensive alliance, by close ideological bonds between the two ruling 
Communist parties, and by an extensive network of Soviet direct 
controls over the Polish government, "especially in the security ap-
paratus and the armed forces. 
Nevertheless, the Polish people had not abandoned their aspi-
rations for freedom. A popular upheavel, sparked by the Poznan 
workers' rebellion, brought Gomulka back to power. Alliance with 
the USSR was continued and close ideological bonds with Moscow 
were maintained, but direct Soviet controls over the Polish Com-
munist government were abandoned. Important domestic reforms 
were instituted as well. Private ownership in agriculture was upheld 
and the Catholic church's independent position was reaffirmed. 
There was considerable relaxation, although some freedoms were 
subsequently withdrawn, in the intellectual sphere. By the late 1950s, 
prior to the relaxation in Hungary in the 1960s, Poland was clearly 
the freest country in the Soviet orbit.5 Initially, there was also an 
improvement in Poland's relations with the West; but, subsequently, 
and especially after Poland's participation in the invasion of Cze-
choslavakia, the Gomulka regime once more fell into step with the 
Soviet Union. 
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In 1970 the workers' rebellion in the coastal cities ended the 
then sterile Gomulka regime and brought Edward Gierek to power. 
Once more substantial reforms were introduced. The Communist 
government showed greater concern for the people's standard of 
living and, from the mid-1970s, it also tolerated the activities of the 
unofficial democratic opposition. At the same time Poland's relations 
with the western powers, including those with the United States, 
improved markedly. Extensive personal travel by the Poles to the 
West was tolerated. Poland played an active role in promoting East-
West détente and particularly in the progress of the CSCE. Eco-
nomic relations with the western countries were expanded and 
Poland obtained western credits amounting in 1980 to some $20 
billion. 
In the second half of the 1970s, however, the situation in the 
country deteriorated once more. Intellectuals were angered by the 
renewed restrictions on their freedoms and the workers became 
impatient with the deteriorating economic conditions. When drastic 
price increases were announced in the summer of 1980, sponta-
neous strikes spread throughout the country, culminating in the 
rise of the free trade unions named Solidarity. Soon afterwards 
Gierek resigned and was replaced as the Communist party First 
Secretary by Stanislaw Kania.6 
Solidarity's initial objectives were relatively modest. Above all, 
it strove to provide an effective channel to articulate the workers' 
grievances. It also advanced some demands for expansion of per-
sonal, religious and intellectual freedoms, but these did not chal-
lenge the existing political system outright for, at the beginning of 
the movement, it appeared that achieving a compromise between 
the Communist government and the Polish people—similar to that 
of 1956 or 1970—would still be possible. Gradually, though, Soli-
darity's demands became more far-reaching. The workers were 
joined by other segments of the Polish society demanding freedoms 
of their own. By the second half of 1981 a broad popular upheaval 
was under way in Poland. Although it never reached the violent 
stage of the Hungarian revolution in 1956, it certainly exceeded the 
agitation of the masses during the Czechoslovak events in 1968.7 
Poland's incremental revolution affected several elements of 
Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. By proposing free elections 
Solidarity demanded not only the democratization of the Polish 
Communist system, but, in effect, its replacement by democracy. 
Poland's continued participation in the Warsaw pact was never 
directly questioned, but the appeal by the September 1981 Solidarity 
Congress to the workers in the other Communist states to form free 
trade unions of their own, challenged Soviet ideological supremacy 
in the area. Finally, one of the leaders of the democratic opposition, 
and subsequently a key Solidarity advisor, Jacek Kuron, proposed 
in the fall of 1981 that Poland should assume a position similar to 
that of Finland. 
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From the start, the Soviet leaders took a negative view toward 
the changes in Poland. The very existence of free trade unions was 
incompatible with the Soviet notion of socialism and they did not 
conceal their hostility towards Solidarity. As the Polish incremental 
revolution gathered momentum, the opposition to it from Moscow 
also stiffened. The Soviets were, however, reluctant to intervene 
directly in Poland as they had in Hungary in 1956 and Czechosla-
vakia in 1968, for this would have had serious adverse effects upon 
their relations with the West. Consequently, they applied strong 
pressure upon the Polish Communist government to restrict the 
scope of changes in the country on its own. In mid-September 
Moscow bluntly demanded that Warsaw restrain Solidarity and 
warned that its failure to do so would amount to a failure of allied 
obligations. 
From then on events in Poland moved swiftly. In October Kania 
was replaced as First Secretary of the Communist party by General 
Wojciech Jaruzelski, who, since February 1981, had held the post 
of Prime Minister. Negotiations with Solidarity became stalemated 
and efforts by the Primate of Poland, Archbishop Jozef Glemp, to 
revive them were to no avail. On December 13, 1981, martial law 
was declared throughout the country. Personal freedoms were drast-
ically curtailed, activities of all organizations, including the free trade 
unions, were suspended, and some 6,000 Solidarity leaders were 
interned. 
Introduction of martial law in Poland was greeted with satisfac-
tion in Moscow, but it produced an adverse response from the West, 
particularly from the United States. The western democracies had 
been much impressed by Solidarity. Its initial peaceful and gradual 
approach to changing the Communist system seemed to fit perfectly 
with the western notions of how desirable changes in Eastern Eu-
rope could be brought about. As Solidarity abandoned its moderate 
stance, there was growing concern, but the movement continued to 
enjoy substantial popularity in the West. 
In response to the introduction of martial law in Poland the 
Reagan administration applied economic sanctions not only against 
the Polish military regime but also against the USSR, which it held 
responsible for the suppression of freedoms in Poland. The Western 
Europeans and the Canadians were more restrained, but they agreed 
with the Americans that before restoration of normal relations with 
Warsaw and Moscow three conditions would have to be fulfilled: 
martial law should be lifted, the internees should be released and 
the dialogue between the Communist government and the Polish 
society should be resumed.8 
III . 
At the helm of the Military Council of National Salvation, which 
took power in the country in December of 1981, stands General of 
the Army Wojciech Jaruzelski. He has assumed virtually dictatorial 
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powers in the country for, in addition to becoming Chairman of 
the MCNS, he has retained his posts of First Secretary of the 
Communist party, Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence. 
Despite his central position on the political scene, however, Jaruz-
elski still remains little known to the Poles. He has been a very 
private man, avoiding, as if deliberately, much public exposure. 
Until 1981 his entire career was in the army, culminating in his 
becoming the Minister of National Defence in 1968. In 1970 he 
became a Politburo member, but he still managed to stay in the 
background, preoccupied with purely military affairs. Altogether, 
as one of the leading western observers of the Polish scene observed, 
"Jaruzelski is an enigma, a mystery man whose attitudes and behav-
ior are not easily explained."9 
One fact in the Jaruzelski career, however, stands out. There 
is no question of his commitment to Poland's alliance with the Soviet 
Union. As a young man during World War II he joined the Polish 
army in the USSR, and after the war he stayed in the military 
service, joining the Communist party in 1947. During the Stalinist 
period he did very well, becoming a general at the age of 33. In 
the various military posts which he subsequently occupied, head of 
the Political Administration of the Armed Forces, Chief of Staff, 
Deputy and finally Minister of Defence, he must have maintained 
very close ties with the Soviet military establishment and, presum-
ably, enjoyed their confidence.10 Jaruzelski's taking over power in 
Poland, then, should fully satisfy Moscow's security concerns. There 
is no doubt that under his leadership the country will remain a 
faithful member of the Warsaw Pact. 
How far Jaruzelski will be willing, and able, to meet Soviet 
ideological expectations is another matter. In this respect his back-
ground is more ambivalent. He comes from a family of minor 
gentry with strong patriotic traditions and, before the war, he 
attended an exclusive Catholic boarding school. He apparently found 
himself in the USSR during WW II not by his own choice for he 
was deported there. T o what extent he has remained committed to 
Polish patriotic values is, of course, impossible to tell. Still, his 
manner is unmistakably that of the Polish intelligentsia and, on 
various occasions in the past, he has made gestures indicating that 
he is well aware of the Polish national traditions. Jaruzelski's military 
coup was aimed at saving the Communist political system in Poland, 
which in his opinion—and he seems genuinely to believe this—was 
threatened by the rising tide of popular unrest. This, however, does 
not answer the question as to what brand of Communism he would 
like to embrace. 
It seems that the model which Jaruzelski would like to adopt 
in Poland would be similar to that in existence in Hungary since 
the mid-1960s. Since the adoption of martial law, the Hungarian 
lessons have been given (no doubt intentionally) a good deal of 
publicity in the Polish media. In the spring a lead article in Polityka 
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discussed in some detail the methods of overcoming the crisis in 
Hungary in 1956, where, as in Poland in 1982, ". . . the nation was 
deeply divided and the country was in a very difficult economic 
situation." Janos Radar's tactics of firmness in dealing with anti-
Communist opposition on the one hand and of flexibility in winning 
the people to his side on the other hand were praised. The Hun-
garian leader's refusal to bow to the conservative elements in the 
party, who wanted to exploit the suppression of the revolution in 
1956, to return to the sterile Rakosi regime, and to suppress all the 
reforms, was singled out as his special achievement. Radar's readi-
ness to fill responsible posts in the government with non-party 
experts was emphasized as well.11 
Jaruzelski probably would like to compress the Hungarian ex-
periences into a shorter period in Poland. Since the Polish upheaval 
was non-violent he hopes to deal with it in a milder fashion. Thus, 
while the military regime made it quite clear that it would not 
hesitate to use force whenever necessary, there has been no unleash-
ing of indiscriminate terror. The losses of life during the military 
coup were minimal; in fact, they were fewer than those suffered 
during the popular upheavals of 1956 or 1970. From among the 
people interned in December 1981 only about 10 per cent remained 
in custody by mid-1982. During the same period more than 3,000 
people were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment for viola-
tions of the martial laws—in most extreme cases running up to ten 
years—by the military tribunals. It is generally expected in Poland, 
however, that they will not serve their full terms, but eventually will 
receive amnesty. Various anti-regime demonstrations were forcibly 
dispersed by the riot police, but at the same time restrictions im-
posed on personal freedoms have been gradually lifted. In July 
Jaruzelski announced that, should there be no renewed unrest, the 
martial law would be lifted before the end of the year. The jour-
nalists' and the students' unions were formally disbanded, and the 
trade unions remained in abeyance, but most of the other organi-
zations which had been suspended were permitted to resume their 
activities. Indeed, considering the relative leniency of the military 
rule, the Poles sometimes refer to it as "martial law à la polonaise "l2 
Meanwhile, in his various public statements General Jaruzelski 
has elaborated the goals of the military regime. While he has made 
it clear that there will be no return to the situation of 1981, when 
Solidarity occupied the central place on the Polish political scene, 
he has also emphasized that the errors of the Gierek regime will 
not be repeated. In fact, Gierek and some of his top lieutenants 
were interned in December 1981 and since then a special tribunal 
has been established to try them for abusing their powers and for 
bringing the country to the verge of economic bankruptcy. An 
extensive purge has been underway in the Communist party with 
some 1 million people leaving its ranks in the last year. They were 
mostly sympathizers of Solidarity, but some of the conservatives 
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have lost their party cards too. In the top party and government 
positions Jaruzelski has systematically eliminated both leading lib-
erals and conservatives, replacing them with his own followers. 
Among the replacements are many army officers as well as civilian 
experts, especially from the academe. 
Under martial law various reforms continued to be introduced. 
They were more moderate than those which had been proposed in 
1980-81, but some of them still bore an imprint of the Solidarity 
days. As of January 1, 1982 a major economic reform, aimed at 
decentralization and rationalization of the economic system along 
the Hungarian lines, was adopted. Although, admittedly, due to the 
operation of martial law, the realization of some aspects of economy 
reform—notably the establishment of the workers' self-government 
in factories—had to be suspended, its full implementation remains 
the government's avowed objective.13 The rights of the cooperatives 
and individual craftsmen were enlarged. Broad autonomy of the 
universities was also upheld, at least in principle. Various other 
reforms have stayed on the agenda of the Sejm and the debates 
there have continued to be lively and even controversial. The non-
party deputies have at times registered their opposition by either 
abstaining from a vote or even by voting against some government 
measures. Radio and television, controlled by party conservatives, 
have been totally uninspiring, but at least some papers have been 
more spirited. The liberal Communist weekly Polityka, whose editor-
in-chief, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, is also deputy Premier in Jaruzelski's 
government, has continued to espouse moderate reforms. 
Indeed, in the domestic sphere, in some respects the Jaruzelski 
regime has even reached beyond the Hungarian period. The Sejm 
has passed legislation reaffirming the rights of individual farmers 
to private property. Further, the Catholic church has continued to 
occupy a privileged position. It was exempted from the ban on 
meetings under marital law; in fact, during Christmas and Easter 
religious holidays the curfew was deliberately lifted. Sunday mass 
continues to be broadcast on state radio. The Catholic press has 
resumed publication. The Catholics were also given more govern-
ment positions than ever in the past. They now hold two seats on 
the State Council, as well as a Deputy-Speakership of the Sejm, and 
a Deputy Prime Minister's Office. 
Finally, the Jaruzelski regime has declared its readiness to 
maintain Poland's bonds with the West and to continue to support 
East-West détente. It has repeatedly expressed hopes that with the 
progress of stability in Poland, sanctions will be lifted and normal 
relations with the western democracies, including the United States, 
will be restored. In May 1982 Deputy Foreign Minister Jozef Wiejacz 
explicitly noted the close interdependence between internal devel-
opments in Poland and the country's external position. "The sooner 
we attain national reconciliation," he asserted, "the more our inter-
national position will improve."14 The Director of the Polish Insti-
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tute of International Affairs, Prof. Janusz Simonides, observed a 
feedback between progress in East-West relations and the situation 
in Poland. "In conditions of détente, "he concluded, "we should 
have better prospects of overcoming our difficulties and of coming 
out of our present crisis."15 
Jaruzelski's political program has been strongly opposed by the 
conservatives in the Communist party. As noted above, their influ-
ence at the top has been declining, but they still remain strongly 
entrenched in many influential positions in the party apparatus and 
the state administration. They enjoy broad support, moreover, in 
the middle echelon of bureaucrats and managers who are appre-
hensive about the reforms curtailing their own authority and jealous 
of outside experts being brought into the government. The con-
servatives thus have challenged all three aspects of the Jaruzelski 
program. They have been critical of relative leniency of the martial 
law measures and they have pressed for sharpening repressions 
against the opposition. They have also striven to arrest, or at least 
to restrict as much as possible, the progress of reforms. 
Finally, the conservatives have advocated cutting Poland's bonds 
with the West. They have played up the ideological conflict in East-
West relations and, no doubt, would welcome a revival of the cold 
war and the rigid division of Europe into two opposed blocs. They 
have even opposed receiving economic aid from the western de-
mocracies, which they tend to view as imperialist means to subvert 
the Communist system in Poland. The conservatives have not hesi-
tated to take their case directly to the Soviets. At the Conference 
on "Philosophy, politics and culture" held in Moscow in April 1982, 
the Rector of the Higher Party School of Social Sciences, Norbet 
Mich ta, denounced Poland's contacts with the West wholesale. "The 
ideologues if imperialism, to mention only Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski 
or Prof. Adam Bromke," he argued, "do not conceal that the 
development of economic, scientific and cultural exchanges, the 
granting of credits, particularly to Poland, are aimed at serving the 
political goal of weakening the socialist bloc."16 
Yet, it does not seem likely that the Polish conservatives' den-
unciations will find a sympathetic ear in Moscow. Jaruzelski's emu-
lation of Kadar probably would be preferable to the USSR. After 
all, there should be no ideological obstacles to carrying out in Poland 
reforms similar to those which have already been successfully tested 
in Hungary. The Soviet leaders probably would not oppose, if only 
to relieve themselves of the burden, continued Western assistance 
to the Polish economy. They would like the western sanctions against 
the USSR over Poland to be lifted and the thorny Polish issue to 
be altogether removed from the East-West agenda. Jaruzelski always 
seems to have enjoyed Moscow's confidence and, at present, after 
he has spared it the embarrassment of direct intervention in Poland, 
his standing there most likely has been enhanced. The atmosphere 
of his visit to the USSR early in March, where, incidentally, he 
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underlined the necessity of continuing domestic reforms in Poland, 
was distinctly cordial. 
IV. 
So far General Jaruzelski has managed to assert his control 
over the country, but he has not succeeded in winning over the 
Polish people. Official sources admit that a bare majority of the 
Poles approved of the introduction of martial law while unofficial 
sources claim that by the spring of 1982 as many as 80 per cent of 
the people, especially among the younger generation, continued to 
oppose military rule.17 The abrupt ending of their high hopes linked 
to the rise of Solidarity left the Poles stunned, frustrated and often 
angry. Many intellectuals have shunned cooperation with the Com-
munist government, and the workers often have opted to work only 
half-heartedly. 
The atmosphere in the country has not been conducive to a 
national reconciliation. Reforms carried out without the participa-
tion of Solidarity have been received with distrust. The drastic price 
increases doubling and even tripling prices of some basic goods 
introduced on February 1, 1982 as a part of the rationalization of 
the economic system have only intensified animosity towards the 
Jaruzelski regime. The delay by the government in arriving at some 
decision about the future of the trade unions, amidst contradictory 
statements, at times reassuring and on other occasions petulant, 
rewarding Solidarity, has only added to the uncertainty and con-
fusion in the country. The psychological gap separating the Com-
munist government and the Polish people has remained profound. 
Soon after imposition of martial law there also emerged a 
formidable organized opposition against it. Segments of Solidarity, 
led by some of its well-known leaders who escaped arrest in Decem-
ber 1981, have continued their activities underground. The samizdat 
publications have proliferated. In February, and again in May, 
massive pro-Solidarity demonstrations were staged in various Polish 
cities. At the end of July, following Jaruzelski's concessions earlier 
in that month which were judged to be unsatisfactory by the un-
derground leaders, more open protests were announced for late 
summer. Meanwhile, a debate over Solidarity's tactics has been 
conducted in its publications. This discussion has revealed, none-
theless, considerable differences in the ranks of the opposition. 
Jacek Kuron, writing from a detention camp in February, took 
the most radical position, in effect re-affirming his earlier proposals 
for the "Finlandization" of Poland. The military regime, in his 
opinion, had failed to subdue the Polish society while the deterio-
rating economic conditions contributed to mounting tensions in the 
country. In those conditions, increasing spontaneous resistance is 
inevitable, and it cannot be crushed by repression. Violence would 
only breed violence. Kuron predicted that in the next few months 
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there will be another popular upheaval in Poland which will over-
throw the military regime. He recognized that such a development 
could lead to a Soviet intervention. To prevent this the Soviet 
leaders should be reassured that even without the Communist gov-
ernment their security interests would be respected by the Poles. 
Kuron admitted that he cannot vouch that such a declaration would 
effectively protect Poland from a Soviet intervention, but, should 
this happen, he warned, "it would be the last act of the USSR."18 
Several underground Solidarity leaders have taken up argu-
ment with Kuron. They all agree that in order to achieve genuine 
changes in the country continued resistance is necessary, but they 
caution against staging an outright confrontation with the military 
regime. Violence on the part of the Polish society, argued Zbigniew 
Bujak, leader of the Solidarity Warsaw region, would only produce 
more violence by the Communist authorities. Should this fail to 
pacify the country, there would be an outside intervention.19 There 
is no reason to believe, added Aleksander Hall, a Solidarity activist 
from Gdansk, that in 1982 the Soviet Union would tolerate an 
overthrow of the Communist government in Poland. The resist-
ance's objective "should not be to remove the Communist party 
from power, but to compel it to extend concessions to the Polish 
people. This is not because we love the present government or 
accept its moral right to rule Poland, but because there is no other 
way. Anybody who fails to see that is indulging in lunatic politics."20 
The underground Solidarity leaders, then, signalled that, at least 
for the time being, they would be willing to abandon their political 
objectives. In exchange for the restoration of Solidarity as a genuine 
free trade union they would mitigate its program. 
An even more moderate position was adopted by the Catholic 
church. While it has openly disapproved of the martial law, at the 
same time it has clearly disassociated itself from the extreme political 
demands of Solidarity. At the end of February the Episcopate called 
for a national reconciliation and continuation of reforms within the 
limits imposed by Poland's external position. These proposals were 
further elaborated in a statement issued by the Primate's Social 
Council composed of prominent lay Catholics and chaired by Pro-
fessor Stanislaw Stomma. The Council condemned violent resistance 
which could lead to a vicious circle of terror and repression. It 
praised the workers' protests in 1980 for initiating the process of 
renewal in Poland, but it appealed to Solidarity to critically review 
its past experiences. Invoking the Encyclical "Laborem Exercens," 
issued by John Paul II , the Council stressed that the goal of the 
trade unions is not to engage in political activities but to serve the 
interests of the working people.21 
The realities of Poland's external position were presented in 
greater detail in a commentary by Professor Stomma. The USSR, 
he asserted, could accept new changes in Poland, but only as long 
as they stay within the limits of a "socialist system." This meant, 
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first, that the people in power in Poland must enjoy the confidence 
of the USSR, and, second, that the internal reforms "could be 
characterized as 'socialist' . . . . These are broad limits, but they also 
determine finite boundaries." Solidarity at first followed the tactics 
of "small steps," but soon it tried to challenge the existing system. 
There was a marked difference between its goals at its inception in 
August 1980 and those adopted at its Congress in the autumn of 
1981. By that time ". . . Solidarity spontaneously embraced an un-
compromising struggle for sovereignty . . . . It was for this reason 
that we have suffered yet another national defeat." Yet, concluded 
Stomma, not everything was lost. An internal compromise is still 
feasible. "There is no point in just being offended—it is necessary 
persistently to search [for new solutions] put them forward and 
press for their realization. Winning an internal peace in Poland is 
a categorical imperative."22 
By the Spring of 1982, then, both the Jaruzelski regime and 
the dominant wing of the opposition had declared their willingness 
to seek an accommodation. Except for the radical elements in 
Solidarity there had emerged a broad consensus that, at present, 
the goal of abandoning the Communist system was unattainable. 
There was also agreement that the system should be reformed from 
within. Considerable differences remain, however, as to what con-
crete changes should be undertaken. The Jaruzelski regime seems 
willing to accept reforms similar to those which have existed in 
Hungary since the mid-1960s, while preserving the peculiarities 
which had been adopted in Poland in 1956, namely, private own-
ership in agriculture and the unique position of the Catholic church. 
Still, there are reasons to believe that Jaruzelski's present posi-
tion will not satisfy even the most moderate elements of the oppo-
sition. It is important to remember that the changes introduced in 
Hungary in the 1960s were preceded by several years of harsh 
repression. In contrast the repressions in Poland by the military 
regime, so far, have been relatively lenient. The high hopes for 
substantial reforms which they entertained during the Solidarity 
days are still quite fresh in the minds of the Poles. A report 
prepared by the highly respected group of Polish intellectuals called 
"Experience and the Future," issued early in April 1982, made this 
quite explicit. "The philosophy of restricted liberalization, which is 
the essence of Kadarism, stands in a striking contrast to the strong 
striving for genuine independence aroused in August 1980."23 
The minimal conditions, then, which the Polish people would 
be willing to accept as a price for reconciliation with the Jaruzelski 
regime still go beyond the Hungarian reforms even as supplemented 
by the gains of the Polish upheaval of 1956. The Poles would 
certainly insist upon the restoration of trade unions which genuinely 
articulate the aspirations of the workers, if only in the economic 
and social sphere. In other words, they would expect that, the 
48 
essence of the Gdansk agreement of August 31, 1980 would be 
respected by the Communist government. 
The Poles would also hope for the establishment of some 
institutional channels, within the limits of the existing system, to 
express their political aspirations. The most practical way to accom-
plish this goal would be to continue to expand the Catholic repre-
sentation in the government. Indeed, it should be possible in Poland 
to achieve the Italian "historical compromise" à rebours. In Italy the 
Communist party does not formally participate in the Christian 
Democratic government, but has an effective say in its major deci-
sions; in Poland the Catholics could assume a similar position. By 
obtaining a sufficient representation in the government and, partic-
ularly, in the Sejm, they could become a significant, although not 
dominant, force in the Polish political system. In order to perform 
this role, however, the Catholic representation ought to be genuine 
and commanding broad respect in the Polish society. Unless those 
minimal terms of the Poles are met, there can be little prospect for 
internal peace in the country. In such circumstances their frustra-
tions could lead to a spontaneous, even if disastrous, popular up-
heaval. 
There is also another danger ahead for the Poles. It is not 
impossible that after consolidating its rule the Jaruzelski regime may 
turn away from the progress of reforms. Like its predecessors, the 
Gomulka and the Gierek regimes, it may stagnate and fall back 
upon old autocratic ways of ruling the country. It will be pushed 
in this direction by the still strong conservative elements in the 
Communist party. In addition, Jaruzelski might become disillu-
sioned by what he would consider persistent and unreasonable 
demands by the opposition, which he, in turn, would blame for 
failing to reach a national reconciliation. Instead of evolving in the 
direction of the Hungarian model then, Poland may slide down 
towards the Czechoslovak model of a repressive and sterile Husak 
regime. 
V. 
The "Prague Spring" of 1968 evoked considerable sympathy in 
the West, and its suppression by the Warsaw Pact forces initially 
had a substantial negative impact in East-West relations.24 Yet, it 
was soon forgotten. Despite the fact that the situation in Czechoslo-
vakia did not improve, in the spring of 1969 the SALT I negotia-
tions between the United States and the Soviet Union started, and 
by 1972 East-West détente was in full swing. It cannot be ruled out 
that even if the situation in Poland should develop basically like 
that in Czechoslovakia, the western powers might, sooner or later, 
resume their search for a relaxation of tensions with the USSR. 
Such an outcome would represent the optimum situation for which 
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Moscow could hope. It would amount to an acknowledgement of 
the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe in a pre-Helsinki 
sense. 
The western reaction to the imposition of martial law in Poland 
was, in fact, relatively modest. The western democracies all protested 
against the restriction of personal freedoms in Poland and the 
suppression of Solidarity. However the sanctions adopted by West-
ern European countries as well as by Canada and Japan were largely 
symbolic. Only the United States took more drastic steps. The 
American reaction has been affected by the specific ideological 
coloration of the Reagan administration and may not survive beyond 
1984. First, Washington's sanctions were not applied consistently. 
American-Soviet negotiations to limit the nuclear arms' race have 
been since resumed, and the grain embargo, which could hurt the 
USSR the most, has not been used. Second, the United States' 
attempts to prevent the construction of a gas pipeline from Siberia 
to Western Europe, invoking the continuation of the martial law in 
Poland as its rationale, have been met with resolute resistance from 
its NATO allies. 
The Poles are aware of the possibility that in the long run the 
West may simply write them off. The radicals would like to prevent 
this by intensifying the internal Polish conflict, even at the risk of 
provoking a direct Soviet intervention, in order to complicate East-
West relations still further. In their frustration and anger some of 
them perhaps would not even be adverse to sparking a major 
confrontation over Poland. This is, presumably, what Kuron meant 
when he referred to a Soviet invasion of Poland as potentially "the 
last act of the USSR." In contrast, the moderates view the West's 
cautious policy as an additional reason for circumspection on the 
part of the Poles. The west's admiration for Solidarity, Stomma 
observed pointedly, stemmed from the fact that it offered ". . . hopes 
for an evolutionary, and it should be underlined, an evolutionary 
transformation of socialism. The realization of this goal calls for a 
strategy of small steps."25 
Yet, there is no question that the crisis in Poland has been 
more serious than that in Czechoslovakia in 1968. It is not only that 
Poland is a far larger country and that the opposition against the 
Communist system has permeated the masses to a still greater 
degree. It must also be remembered that the suppression of Czech-
oslovakia took place in the pre-détente era. After a decade of 
relaxation, a similar eventuality in Poland would have profoundly 
negative psychological effects in East-West relations. The western 
hopes for a gradual and peaceful expansion of freedom as embod-
ied in the Helsinki accords, would be dashed. 
The difficulties facing Poland are not unique in Eastern Eu-
rope. Poland was the first country where the crisis came to a head 
but similar potentially explosive conditions exist in several other 
countries in the region notably in Rumania and Czechoslovakia. 
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They too are suffering from economic slowdowns and are stagger-
ing under extensive debts to the West. Declining living conditions 
contribute to rising social tension. The working class, and particu-
larly the younger people, are increasingly restive. The remainder 
of the 1980s then could be a turbulent period in Eastern Europe. 
It is entirely possible that before the end of the decade, in one 
country or another, we shall witness the rise of other mass protest 
movements similar to Solidarity. Poland, thus, may well serve as a 
model as to how such crises are to be overcome. 
The fact that the Soviet Union abstained from directly inter-
vening in Poland and, instead, left the suppression of Solidarity to 
the Jaruzelski regime, suggests that it was conscious of the inter-
national significance of the developments in that country. While 
Moscow was determined to protect what it considered its essential 
interests in Poland, at the same time it tried to avoid, or at least to 
mitigate, the negative consequences of such an action in East-West 
relations. For the same reasons it might be willing to tolerate the 
continuation of moderate Polish reforms. Many Poles are aware of 
this situation as well. As the report of the "Experience and the 
Future" group put it: ". . . the fact that in the last instance the USSR 
did not let itself to be drawn into a direct intervention indicates 
that some possibilities for the future still exist."26 The Polish mod-
erates would like to exploit the existing opportunities to evolve, in 
Poland, the Hungarian model of Communism, perhaps even an 
augmented Hungarian model, and not the Czechoslovakian. In 
those endeavours they count upon sympathy and support from the 
western democracies. 
No doubt, an evolution of the Polish political system along 
Hungarian lines, rather than Czechoslovak, would be in the West's 
interest. The continuation of reforms in Poland would maintain the 
momentum of the Helsinki accords throughout Eastern Europe. It 
would strengthen the liberal tendencies in the region and possibly 
spill over into the Soviet Union itself. At the same time it would 
help to revive the progress of détente in Europe. Presumably, the 
better the climate in East-West relations, the greater the chances 
for the different Eastern European nations to enlarge their free-
dom. Over a space of years this should pave the way for gradual 
dismantling of the military blocs and the spheres of influence and, 
ultimately, for overcoming the historical division of Europe. 
Western policies towards Poland should reflect the West's long 
range goals in Eastern Europe. Limited irritation will not do. What 
is needed is consumate and enduring diplomacy. Above all, the 
West should deal with the Jaruzelski regime in a purely pragmatic 
fashion. It is not a question of approving or disapproving the 
Communist system in Poland but of bringing it as much as possible 
into line with the wishes of the Polish people, within the context of 
the realities prevailing in the international sphere. 
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The West should direct its policies towards strengthening the 
moderate forces in Polish society, both in the opposition and in the 
government. It should refrain from conveying the impression that 
it is behind the vehemence of the Solidarity radicals but, rather, 
should throw its weight on the side of prudence as advocated by 
the Catholic church. It should avoid posing ultimatums to the 
Jaruzelski regime which play into the hands of the conservatives in 
the Communist party. The western powers should not regard the 
three demands which they posed in December 1981—lifting the 
martial law, releasing the internees and resuming a dialogue be-
tween the Communist government and the Polish people—as pre-
conditions which must be fully met before normalization of relations 
with Poland can proceed. Instead, those demands should be viewed 
as ultimate goals, and partial progress towards their realization of 
the part of the Polish Jaruzelski government should be met with 
commensurate steps in lifting its quarantine by the West. 
Western opportunities to assist Poland are restricted but never-
theless real. To accomplish its goals the West has three means at its 
disposal. First, it can influence the developments in Poland through 
appropriate propaganda, especially that aimed directly at that coun-
try. In an atmosphere charged with emotion the western radio 
stations should exercise utmost care in presenting the facts to the 
Poles as accurately and as objectively as possible. Western leaders 
should not indulge in any rhetoric which they do not intend to 
support with deeds. Above all, they should not make any statements 
which may inflame even further the frustrations and anger of the 
Polish people. 
Second, economic sanctions against Poland should be lifted as 
soon as possible and replaced with positive inducements. The West 
should take its cue here from the Polish Catholic church which, 
from the start, has registered its reservations about the western 
punitive policy. A prominent Catholic parliamentarian, Janusz Za-
blocki, defined those objections well. "It is with much regret that 
we note the economic sanctions being applied against Poland by the 
present administration in the United States and by some Western 
European states," he declared. "They do not seem to be aware that 
the consequences of their actions are not helpful to upholding either 
our sovereignty or democratization and in the last instance that they 
are ultimately damaging to the Polish people."27 As the reforms in 
Poland advance the West should not only lift the sanctions, but also 
should offer Poland aid to overcome its economic difficulties. The 
country's participation in the various international financial orga-
nizations and, particularly, its membership in the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund, should be encouraged and new 
credits should be extended, although more carefully geared to the 
progress of economic reforms than in the past. 
Finally, the developments in Poland should be deliberately placed 
by the West in a broad context of the progress of détente. Both 
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formal and informal diplomatic channels should be used to that 
end. The western powers, and the United States in particular, 
should patiently explain to the Soviet Union that they do not strive 
to detach Poland from the Warsaw Pact, but to encourage that 
country to play a constructive role in East-West relations. A Poland 
allied to the USSR, but permitted to evolve a system fitting its own 
traditions could serve as a useful bridge between the two parts of 
Europe. In short, the West should support the Polish goals as 
defined by the editor-in-chief of the Warsaw Catholic weekly, Lad, 
Witold Olszewski: 
We shall probably agree, without much argument, that the 
Polish crisis could be resolved with less difficulty if relations 
in Europe, and in the entire world, were to become peaceful 
and harmonious. In other words, if we were to return to 
détente . . . We should remember that we still represent a 
substantial force in Europe. Regardless of our internal diffi-
culties, we have to find in ourselves enough strength to defend 
not only our weakened position in the world, but also the 
progress of détente.28 
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